This paper examines the effect of technological uncertainty on the optimal pricing and investment decisions in a two-sided market. A platform offers a basic good and a developer offers a complementary good. The performance of the complementary good is stochastic and is endogenously determined by the pricing policy the platform adopts. Heterogeneous consumers join the platform either before uncertainty is resolved or after. In the former case, consumers obtain the basic good and an option to benefit from the complementary good in the future. The platform trades off building an earlier mass of consumer base and extracting profits from late adopters. Consumers are divided into three groups: early adopters, late adopters, and those who never join the platform. A platform's pricing policy depends on the value of the complementary good and the cost of its development. If the cost is small, a price skimming policy is optimal. When the cost is higher, price skimming remains optimal if the value of the complementary good is either small or relatively high. For intermediate values, the platform adopts a price penetration policy. We discuss some examples from the empirical literature in light of the model.
Introduction
The 2020 Porsche Taycan delivers incredible acceleration and aggressive styling. One of the headline features of Porsche's first electric car is its 800-volt charging system. Porsche claims this high-power system allows an 80% charge in just 22.5 minutes, which is much quicker than other current charging systems. 1 But that will not matter if Taycan drivers can't find a compatible charging station. In the United States, Electrify America is working to develop a widespread system of charging stations suitable for Porsche's new electric car. However, some of the charging stations might not receive construction permits from urban areas due to safety, zoning, and environmental regulations. Taycan's success depends on the success of Electrify America, which remains uncertain at this point.
The video game industry faces similar challenges. Console manufacturers' market position and survival depend not only on the console's technological prowess but also on the quality of video games introduced by the game developers. For example, Sega introduced its console Saturn five months before Sony made its entry into the video game market in 1995 with its PlayStation. Saturn immediately faced problems in the competition because Sony was better able to attract third-party game developers. 2 This illustrates that uncertainty surrounding the development of quality games is of utmost importance to console manufacturers.
The smartphone market is yet another one where uncertainty plays a critical role. When Apple launched its iPhone in 2007, it announced that it might provide occasional software updates and upgrades free of charge (see Brochet et al. (2013) ). Apple also equipped its phones with only about 500 applications when the App Store was launched, which by 2010 had exploded to 300,000 applications (see Boudreau (2012a) ). When purchasing the smartphone back in 2007, early consumers had uncertainty over possible improvements and the availability of some apps in the future.
All the examples above represent a typical two-sided market in which a platform (Porsche/ Sega/Apple) facilitates the interaction between buyers (car users/gamers/smartphone users) and developers (of charging stations/games/apps). A platform offers a basic good (electric vehicle/video game console/smartphone) that is durable and can be used for a long time once purchased. Buyers join a platform that provides a product with basic, though not necessarily minimal, functionality. Developers offer a complementary good, i.e., features to be added to the basic good whose quality (or even availability) is revealed in the future.
In this paper, we study how uncertainty over successful development of the complementary good affects consumer purchasing decisions and the pricing policy the platform adopts.
Our key idea is that, when joining the platform, buyers obtain not only the current basic functionality but also an option to benefit from any enhanced functionality if the complementary good is successfully developed in the future. However, the development of the complementary good is both costly and uncertain, and the probability of success depends on the amount of resources devoted to the development process. Therefore, buyers might not necessarily benefit from it if its realization is unsuccessful.
Relative to the nascent literature on two-sided markets, reviewed below, the novelty of our approach is that we allow the probability that the complementary good is successfully developed to be endogenously determined. Focusing on a "chicken-and-egg" problem, the literature has vastly ignored the dynamic aspect of the cross-group externalities (see Rysman (2009) for a review). In contrast, we study the impact of technological uncertainty on one side of a market, and how it affects the optimal pricing policy the platform employs. Thus, our analysis highlights the impact of endogenously determined network effect on the equilibrium structure of a two-sided market. We show that the platform's pricing policy is an essential tool for jointly managing consumer expectations and thus their purchasing behavior while, at the same time, incentivizing developers of the complementary good to innovate.
We develop a dynamic model of a two-sided market with three players. The first is a monopolistic platform that offers the basic good. The second is a representative seller (developer) who offers the complementary good and bears the cost of its development. The third is a mass of heterogeneous consumers (buyers) who differ in how much they value the basic good. Development of the complementary good is stochastic, i.e., the seller delivers the complementary good with some probability only. Consumers decide whether to buy the basic good (join the platform) before observing whether the complementary good is successfully developed or after it is. The platform chooses 1) the prices buyers must pay for the basic good before and after uncertainty is realized, and 2) a reward the seller obtains.
As in a typical two-sided market, the interaction between buyers and the seller is characterized by two network effects. First, almost all durable goods exhibit a direct network effect in that they draw on common use and repair expertise. 3 For example, gamers' utility from a particular video game console increases as more gamers opt for that console. Second, there is an indirect network effect: each group values the participation of the other group.
For example, gamers' utility from a particular console rises as the quality and quantity of available games increase. 4 Consumers decide whether to join the platform earlier, i.e., before the outcome of the complementary good is realized, or later, when it is known if the complementary good is successfully developed. If consumers join the platform earlier, they can enjoy the basic good longer, and, in addition, they obtain an option to benefit from the complementary good if it is developed successfully. If consumers wait, they can join the platform when the complementary good is developed. The platform implicitly controls the probability of success by choosing the seller's reward. While a higher probability delivers a higher expected surplus to consumers who join the platform earlier, it also changes the optimal timing of joining the platform for some consumers. For a given pricing policy, more consumers are likely to join the platform earlier if the probability goes up. Given the pricing policy announced by the platform, consumers correctly anticipate the probability of success and choose the optimal timing to join the platform that delivers a higher expected utility.
When deciding how many consumers to attract before and after the outcome of the complementary good is realized, the platform is facing the following trade-off. On the one hand, attracting more consumers earlier allows charging buyers who join the platform in the future a higher price due to the direct network effect. On the other hand, to attract a large enough mass of early consumers, the platform must charge a relatively small price earlier. This makes promising the seller a higher reward for success challenging and, as a result, makes it less likely that future buyers can benefit from the indirect effect. Therefore, by fine-tuning the probability of success for the complementary good, the platform trades off building an earlier mass of customer base and extracting profits from early adopters.
We prove that the platform optimally divides all consumers into three groups: 1) lowtype who do not join the platform at all, 2) middle-type who wait and join the platform only if the complementary good is successfully developed, and 3) high-type who join the platform before observing the outcome of the complementary good development. These results match phenomena observed in real life. For instance, this is consistent with the market for electric vehicles where, according to the marketing literature, buyers are divided into three groups: environmentally conscious or technology-oriented consumers who would purchase a vehicle even without a sufficiently developed network of charging stations, the "mass market" represented by consumers who buy a vehicle only if the battery performance is advanced and a high enough number of charging stations is available, and a third group that would rather "walk away" and buy a conventional vehicle rather than an electric one.
We show that the platform employs either a price penetration or price skimming policy: initially setting a low (high) price and increase (decrease) it after the complementary good is successfully developed in the future. On the one hand, there are two reasons to lower the price of the basic good in the future. First, consumers who join the platform earlier enjoy the basic good over two periods rather than just one. Second, early consumers obtain the basic good and an option to benefit from the complementary good in the future due to the indirect network effect. The platform might extract surplus from them and then use a low price strategy in the future.
On the other hand, there are two reasons to increase the price of the basic good in the future. First, a lower early price increases the number of early consumers, and, as a result, the value of the basic good in the future increases due to the direct network effect. Second, consumers join the platform in the future only if the complementary good is successfully developed. Thus, the future price should be high enough to extract surplus from the combination of both the basic and the complementary good due to the indirect effect.
We prove that if the cost of development of the complementary good is low, the platform employs the price skimming policy. Intuitively, in this case, the complementary good is likely to succeed, and, therefore, consumers are likely to join the platform earlier. The platform is then better off by extracting the surplus from early buyers. This is in agreement with the price dynamics for smartphones in general and iPhones, in particular. 5 If the cost of development of the complementary good is relatively high, the optimal pricing policy depends on the value of the complementary good. We show that the platform optimally employs a price skimming (penetration) policy if the value is small (high). Intuitively, for small values of the complementary good, the direct effect dominates, and since early buyers enjoy the basic good longer, the platform lowers the price in the future. We also find another result. When the value of the complementary good becomes sufficiently large, the platform optimally employs the price skimming policy again. Intuitively, if the benefit of the complementary is large, it will be developed almost for sure. Then, consumers who joined the platform earlier are almost certain to benefit from the indirect network effect. The platform is better off by extracting this surplus earlier. This is the case if consumers obtain the basic good mostly to benefit from the complementary one. For example, gamers might buy a video game console to play a particular game: Soccer fans may buy PlayStation to mostly play FIFA 20. This price dynamics is consistent with the optimal pricing policy adopted by electric vehicles, video game console producers, and media service providers reviewed in Section 6.
We also consider two extensions of the main model. In Section 5.1, we study a version of the main model without commitment. We illustrate that the benefit of commitment for the platform is two-fold. First, commitment allows building a larger early consumer base. Second, commitment to a higher price in the future allows charging a higher earlier price. In Section 5.2, we allow the value of the complementary good to be a function of consumer type. This assumption delivers a novel result: The platform optimally sells the basic good only before the outcome of the complementary good is revealed. Therefore, consumers are divided into two groups only, i.e., high types who join the platform before observing whether the complementary good succeeds, and low types who do not join the platform at all.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. The main model and payoffs are introduced in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results of the equilibrium outcomes. Several key extensions are presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses empirical applications. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on two-sided markets. A central theme of the research in this area has been how the platform pricing policy depends on the competitive settings, magnitudes of network effects and the possibility of multihoming. Armstrong (2006) , Rochet and Tirole (2003) , and Bolt and Tieman (2008) develop monopoly and imperfect competition models and show that magnitude of indirect network effects, demand elasticity on each side, and the platform's fee structure affect the platform pricing policy. 6 Most of the papers in the literature that study positive indirect network effects focus on the number of users on each side of the platform: as more users on each side are attracted to the platform, indirect network effects becomes stronger. For instance, Boudreau (2012b) illustrates that the variety of available software grows as the number of software developers increases. However, little is known regarding the factors other than the number of participants (see McIntyre and Srinivasan (2017) ). As the video games market demonstrates, indirect network externalities arise not simply due to the number of game publishers but also the quality of available games. We contribute to this literature by studying the effect of platform pricing on developers' incentives to innovate.
Our paper also belongs to the stream of the literature that investigates the role of forwardlooking consumers and consumer expectations in two-sided markets (see Tan and Zhou (2017) , Hagiu and Ha laburda (2014) , Hagiu and Spulber (2013) , Halaburda and Yehezkel (2013) , Zhu and Iansiti (2012) ). In these papers, consumers form expectations either over prices or over participation on the other side of the market. 7 We allow for consumer heterogeneity and focus on endogenous uncertainty on the developer side. In our model, consumers form expectations over whether the complementary product of sufficient quality will be available in the future or not. 8 Finally, our paper relates to the dynamic pricing literature (see Kumar and Sethi (2009), Liu (2010) , Nair (2007) , Gabszewicz and Garcia (2008) ). Several papers study the interaction between dynamic pricing policy and consumers' strategic behavior that arises due to consumers' ability to postpone their purchases in anticipation of future price decreases. 9 A central question in this strand of literature is how to mitigate the negative effect of consumers' strategic behavior on firms' revenues (see Su and Zhang (2008) , Aviv and Pazgal (2008) , Lai et al. (2010) ). In contrast, strategic consumer behavior in our model is a direct result of consumers' anticipation that the complementary products might be available in the future. In turn, we show that the development of the complementary product affects the platform's optimal pricing policy. Therefore, we demonstrate how the platform employs its pricing policy to modify the intertemporal distribution of consumers.
In summary, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper in the literature on twosided markets that explicitly models investment decisions in a risky environment. Previous literature typically assumes that sellers join a platform either before or simultaneously with the buyers. This simple yet insightful approach, however, might not fully capture and explain the empirical evidence, as buyers in two-sided markets do join a platform expecting a sufficient number of sellers to be available in the future only. We, in contrast, allow buyers 7 Zhu and Iansiti (2012) develop a model in which consumers take into account the availability of future applications when making their purchase decisions. The consumer anticipation is governed by a discount factor that regulates how much the representative consumer values future complementary products. 8 Zhou (2017) presents a model in which consumers strategically choose the timing of platform adoption in anticipation of future complementary products likely to be developed by the sellers. Although Zhou (2017) recognizes the option value involved in consumers' timing decision, that paper does not model explicitly the effect of seller side uncertainty on the timing decision.
9 See, for instance, Dasu and Tong (2010) and Liu and Zhang (2013) .
to join the platform having only some expectations that the seller might join the platform in the future. Our paper differs from the existing literature in the following major dimensions. First, we introduce a stochastic development process for the complementary good and a gradual resolution of uncertainty. Second, we characterize the embedded option value for the early buyers of a two-sided market product. Third, we show that the optimal pricing policy critically depends on the additional value brought by the complementary good.
3 Model Key Players. We consider a model with three players: 1) a monopolistic platform, 2) a mass of heterogeneous consumers, and 3) a representative seller (developer) of the complementary good. The platform offers a basic good and the seller offers a complementary good, i.e., features to be added on to the basic good. In order to incorporate technological uncertainty into the model, we assume that development of the complementary good is stochastic, i.e., the seller successfully develops the complementary good with some probability only. We assume that all the key parameters of the model are common knowledge for all players at the beginning of the game.
Source of Uncertainty.
A key distinguishing feature of our paper is the introduction of endogenous technological uncertainty that is inherent in every innovation process. In most of two-sided markets, development of complementary goods is subject to various technical, legal, financial, organizational, market and even political risks. For example, software developers face various technology risks and often experience failures. Risks might involve economy-wide shocks as well as idiosyncratic ones, i.e., losing to a a rival seller. In the case of new physical products, numerous safety, zoning, and environmental regulations might be a source of uncertainty. For example, charging stations for electric cars might not receive construction permits from urban areas to build a large enough number of stations.
Time-Line. The model is dynamic. The game spans over three time periods t ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
At t = 0, the platform produces the basic good and chooses an optimal pricing policy, i.e., prices p t that consumers have to pay to join the platform at t = 1 and t = 2. 10 In addition, the platfrom chooses a reward b > 0 the seller receives for the successful development of the complementary good. 11 At t = 1, the developer of the complementary good chooses the probability of successful development of the complementary good at t = 2, denoted by 0 P 1. Increasing the probability of success is costly, and the seller bears the cost. At t = 2, the seller either successfully develops the complementary good or fails to do so.
After observing the pricing policy chosen by the platfrom, consumers decide whether to join the platfrom at t = 1 or at t = 2 after paying price p 1 or p 2 , respectively. Crucially, p 1 is the price consumers have to pay before observing whether or not the seller is successful in developing the complementary good, whereas p 2 is the price for joining the platform after observing success or failure of the seller. 12 A representative time-line of the game is plotted in Figure 1 below. 
Payoffs
We now describe the payoff functions for the seller, consumers, and the platform. To simplify the exposition, we assume that all players have a common time discount factor δ = 1. 13
Seller. The development of the complementary good is a random process with a risky outcome. Therefore, the seller is facing a risky investment problem. With probability P , the seller is successful and is paid b. However, with probability 1 − P , the complementary good fails and the seller gets nothing. In order to achieve the probability of success P , a certain level of efforts (investment) is required. The cost of these efforts is given by a quadratic function c(P ):
where A > 0 and c (P ) = 2AP > 0, c (P ) = 2A > 0. 14 Therefore, given a reward b, the seller chooses the probability of success P to maximize
Consumers. We assume that the basic good is durable, i.e., consumers who join the platform at t = 1 get some utility form consumption of the basic good in both periods t = 1 and t = 2. 15 We also assume that the quality of the durable good does not depreciate between the two periods. We introduce two network effects to capture consumer interaction with the platform and the seller of the complementary good. 16 Direct Network Effect. A consumer gets a higher utility from joining the platform when more consumers are using the platform simultaneously. For example, users of an iPhone enjoy it more if their friends have iPhones too. Consumers are heterogeneous and differ in how much they value the basic good. For example, some consumers might have a higher willingness to pay for an iPhone. A consumer of type θ, θ ∈ [0, 1], gets (per period) utility u(θ, N ): [0, 1] × [0, 1] − → [0, +∞) from consumption of the basic good, where θ denotes the intrinsic utility form the basic good, and N is the mass of current users of the basic good. In the main part of the paper, we assume that
We normalize the utility of not joining the platform to zero for each consumer type.
Distribution of Types. The distribution of consumer preferences is given by a continuously differentiable distribution function F (θ) with support [0, 1]. A probability distribution f (θ) = F (θ) over the support defines the relative size of customers with valuation θ ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that the distribution of types is uniform, f (θ) = 1 for θ ∈ [0, 1]. 18 Indirect Network Effect. We introduce an indirect (positive) network effect between consumers and the seller of the complementary good as follows. Consumer's utility depends on 14 The cost of investment captures the cost of developing new performance features, adoption by the product, the cost of making that innovation includes marginal cost of development, any marketing costs and/or download purchases (Li et al., 2016) . 15 Most of the network goods are durable. In particular, this is the case for electric vehicles, smartphones, as well as video game consoles.
16 Almost all durable goods exhibit network effects in that they draw on common use and repair expertise. For example, the so-called "word of mouth" effect: more information is revealed regarding a good and its properties as more consumers buy it. Another example might be the so-called "learning by doing" effect: the seller improves the quality of the product as more consumers submit feedback. 17 We discuss robustness of our main results to a more general utility function in Section 5.3. 18 In Section 5.4, we discuss implications of various other distributions.
the bundle, i.e, combination of the basic and complementary goods. In case the complementary good is successfully developed, each type of consumer obtains an additional utility α(θ) ≥ 0. 19 For example, the utility that current users derive from their electric cars is likely to increase when more charging stations become available in their area. As another example, the utility that current iPhone users will derive from their phone is likely to increase as new apps are developed and increase the phone's functionality.
Strategic Choices
Consumer Choice Problem. Consumers are choosing whether to join the platform before observing if the complementary good is successfully developed (t = 1), or wait till Success/Failure of the complementary good is revealed (t = 2). 20 We denote by N 1 the mass of consumers who purchase the basic good at t = 1, by N S 2 the mass of consumers who purchase the basic good at t = 2 if the complementary good is successfully developed, and by N F 2 the mass of consumers who purchase the basic good at t = 2 even if the complementary good fails to be developed.
When choosing the optimal timing of joining the platform, consumers have to form expectations regarding the probability of success P and the relevant mass of consumers N 1 , N S 2 , and N F 2 . Since each consumer is infinitely small, they do not not take into account the effect of their own decision when to join the platform on the equilibrium values of P , N 1 , N S 2 , and N F 2 . Following the standard assumption in the network equilibrium models, we assume that each consumer correctly anticipates the the values of P , N 1 , N S 2 , and N F 2 in equilibrium.
Optimal Timing to Join the Platform. Consider a type θ consumer who did not join the platform at t = 1 and decided to wait till t = 2. This consumer's utility at t = 2 is 21
Therefore, at t = 1 for a type θ consumer the expected utility of waiting till t = 2 is
Consider now a consumer of type θ who joins the platform at t = 1 after paying price p 1 . If the complementary good is successful, the consumer gets θ(N 1 + N S 2 ) + α(θ) in the future. If the complementary good fails, the consumer gets θ(N 1 + N F 2 ) only. Therefore, the expected utility from joining the platform at t = 1 becomes
The individual rationality constraint implies that a consumer joins the platform at t = 1 if
and finds it optimal to wait till t = 2 otherwise (if U 1 (θ) < U 2 (θ)). 22 Option Value. The expression for U 1 (θ) also characterizes the option value for consumers who join the platform at t = 1. In particular, a consumer who joins the platform at t = 1 after paying p 1 obtains an option value equal to
, represents the direct effect. If the complementary good is successfull, N S 2 consumers will join the platform at t = 2 whereas only N F 2 consumers will join the platform at t = 2 if the complementary good fails. The second term, P × α, represents the indirect effect, i.e., the additional benefit from the complementary good.
Optimal Pricing. Given the mass of consumers N 1 , N S 2 , and N F 2 , the platform collects p 1 N 1 from consumers buying the basic good at t = 1. In addition, with probability P the complementary good is successful and the platform collects p 2 N S 2 at t = 2, whereas the platform collects p 2 N F 2 if the complementary good fails. Without loss of generality, we assume that the cost of producing the basic good is zero. Therefore, the platform chooses prices p 1 , p 2 , and b to maximize 23
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows:
• t = 0 : The platform chooses p 1 , p 2 , the prices of access to platform in two periods, and b, the reward for a success development of the complementary good. We normalize the marginal cost of producing the platform to zero and assume it does not change over time.
• t = 1 : Consumers decide whether to join the platform at t = 1 or wait till t = 2. The seller of the complementary good chooses the probability of successful development of the complementary good at t = 2.
• t = 2 : After observing whether the complementary good was successfully developed or not, consumers (who did not join the platform at t = 1) decide to join the platform or never join.
Table 1 below summarizes the key notation used throughout the paper.
Variable Definition P
Probability of Success in developing the complementary good c(P )
Seller's cost of efforts to achieve probability of Success P θ
Consumer type F (θ), f (θ) Distribution and density functions of types, respectively π S Seller's profit N 1
Mass of consumers buying at t = 1 N S 2 Mass of consumers buying the basic good at t = 2 in case of Success N F 2 Mass of consumers buying the basic good at t = 2 even in the case of Failure N Mass of current users of the product (direct network effect) u(θ, N )
Consumer utility α(θ)
Additional utility from the complementary good (indirect network effects) p 1
Price of the basic good at t = 1 p 2
Price of the basic good at t = 2 b
Reward (bonus) for a successfull development of the complementary good .
The equilibrium value of variables We now describe the equilibrium and the trade-offs involved. We present results and the intuition while all the proofs are delegated to the Appendix. In the main part of the paper, we assume the platform commits to price p 2 in advance, i.e., the platform announces p 2 at t = 1 (before observing outcome of the complementary good development and consumer mass N 1 ) and cannot change it at t = 2. 24 One of many examples of such commitment mechanisms are pre-orders of new products with a fixed price. In Section 5.1, we relax the commitment assumption and allow platform to chose p 2 after observing Success/Failure of the complementary good development and the consumer base N 1 . We solve the model using the solution concept of Rational Expectations Equilibrium. 25 Def inition. Equilibrium (with commitment). Pricesp 1 andp 2 , a rewardb; a success probabilityP ; consumer massN 1 ,N S 2 andN F 2 constitute an equilibrium if
• Seller. Givenb, the seller of the complementary good choosesP to solve
• Consumers. Givenp 1 ,p 2 andP ,
• P latf orm. Pricesp 1 andp 2 , and a rewardb, are chosen as an optimal solution for
We assume the platform cannot make the future price, p 2 , contingent on success/failure of the complementary good. The platform may not even able to specify in advance what the complementary good is to put it into a contract for the consumers. For example, in the electric vehicles car market where the complementary good is a local charging station, the platform (Tesla) cannot announce pricing policy that is contingent on whether a small local charging station at a particular location is developed or not. A video game platform cannot commit in advance to a future price that is contingent on some video game being developed in the future since the platform might not know what type of game will be eventually developed. Apple had limited abilities to foresee exact types of applications would be available in the future when they released iPhones.
25 See (Hagiu, 2006) for the details.
14 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3453090
We now characterize the main elements of the equilibrium. In Section 4.1, we study the seller's optimal choice of the success probability for a given reward b. Next, in Section 4.2, we determine the optimal timing of joining the platform for each consumer type for given prices p 1 and p 2 as well as success probability P . Finally, in Section 4.3, we solve for the platform optimal pricing policy and the corresponding mass of consumers who join the platform at different times in equilibrium.
Seller
Consider the seller's optimization problem for a given reward b. The seller determines the optimal probability of successP as a solution to
The solution has to satisfy the following F
which determines the equilibrium probability of success,P (b) as a function of the reward b:
Note that because c(P ) is convex,P (b) is an increasing function, dP (b) db > 0. Intuitively, by promising a higher price for the complementary good, the platform makes a successful development more likely.
Consumers
We now discuss the consumer optimization problem for given p 1 , p 2 , and P . An arbitrary consumer of type θ, after observing the prices chosen by the platform, decides whether to join at t = 1 (before knowing whether the complementary good is successfully developed or not), or wait till t = 2 and observe success/failure of the complementary good.
If consumers join the platform at t = 1, they obtain both i) the basic good that can be used for two periods, and ii) an option value of using the complementary good in the future if it is successfully developed. For example, buyers of Porsche's Taycan obtain an electric vehicle as well as an opportunity to benefit from a wide network of charging stations that might be developed in the future. Similarly, buyers of a video game console acquire a durable device as well as the opportunity to enjoy games that might be released in the future. 28 If consumers defer their decision till t = 2, they might join the platform only if the complementary good is successfully developed.
We perform the analysis backward by studying consumer choice at t = 2 first. For arbitrary N 1 ≥ 0, N S 2 ≥ 0 and N F 2 ≥ 0, consider a consumer of type θ (who did not join the platform at t = 1) at period t = 2. We denote
There are three relevant types of consumers (see Figure 2 ). First, "high" type consumers who join the platform at t = 2 even if the complementary good fails to be developed: θ ≥ θ. Second, "middle" type consumers who join the platform at t = 2 only if the complementary good is successfully developed: θ ≤ θ < θ. Third, "low" type consumers who do not join the platform at t = 2 even if the complementary good is successfully developed: θ < θ.
Therefore, U 2 (θ) can be rewritten as
In equilibrium, a consumer of type θ (who correctly anticipates values of N 1 , N S 2 , and N F 2 ) joins the platform at t
By comparing U 1 (θ) and U 2 (θ), a consumer of type θ joins the platform at t = 1 if
In Figure 3 below, we present six possible types of consumer for arbitrary prices p 1 and p 2 , success probability P , and consumer mass N 1 , N F 2 , and N S 2 . In Figure 4 , we illustrate the optimal timing of joining the platform for various combinations of prices p 1 and p 2 . When both prices are relatively high (the upper-right corner),
Don't Join Join if S Join Figure 2 : Consumer's decision to join the platform at t = 2 for arbitrary N 1 , N F 2 and N S 2 . The solid red line represents a consumer utility if the complementary good is successfully developed, and the dashed blue line represent a consumer utility if the complementary good fails. High-type consumers (θ θ) join the platform even if the complementary good fails, i.e., as long as u(θ, N 1 +N F 2 )−p 2 0. Middle-type consumers (θ θ < θ) join the platform only if the complementary good is developed, i.e., only if u(θ, N 1 + N S 2 ) + α(θ) − p 2 0. Low-type consumers (θ < θ) do not join the platform. Figure 3 : The optimal timing of joining the platform. A consumer might find it optimal to join the platform before observing the development of the complementary good (t = 1), wait and join only of the complementary good is developed at (t = 2 if S), wait and join the platform regardless of the complementary good development (t = 2), or not to join the platform (never).
consumers do not join the platform at all. If p 2 is relatively higher than p 1 (the upper-left corner), consumers join the platform immediately at t = 1. Intuitively, for this combination of prices, consumers prefer to join the platform without waiting and observing whether the complementary good is successfully developed or not. Finally, if p 2 is relatively smaller than p 1 , consumers wait and joins the platform only after the complementary good is successfully developed at t = 2. For these consumers, the option value of postponing the purchase to the subsequent period is high enough.
Platform
We now derive the platform's pricing policy and discuss the trade-offs involved. To highlight the effect of the technological uncertainty on the optimal pricing policy, we consider a case when each type of consumer equally benefits from the complementary good as the main model. In particular, we assume that the indirect network effect is type-independent, i.e.,
In Section 5.2, we relax this assumption and allow the additional benefit of the complementary good to be a function of the agent's type.
The Optimal Timing of Joining the Platform. We begin the analysis by characterizing the optimal timing of joining the platform for each consumer type. In particular, we ask 1) whether the platform makes it optimal for some consumers to wait and join the platform only after successful development of the complementary good at t = 2, and 2) whether the platform excludes some consumers from the market completely (make it optimal to never buy the basic good). Figure 4 : Consumer decision to join the platform for arbitrary prices p 1 and p 2 . A consumer might find it optimal to join the platform before observing the development of the complementary good (t = 1), wait and join only of the complementary good is developed at (t = 2 only if S), wait and join the platform regardless of the complementary good development (t = 2), or not to join the platform (never).
We prove that in equilibrium all consumers are divided into three adjacent groups according to their type: 1) "high-value" consumers who join the platform at t = 1, 2) "middlevalue" consumers who wait till t = 2 and join the platform only if the complementary good is successfully developed, and 3) "low-value" consumers who never join the platform (see Figure 5 ). 30 When deciding how many consumers to attract at t = 1, the platform is facing the following trade-off. On the one hand, attracting more consumers at t = 1 allows charging future consumers who join the platform at t = 2 a higher price. This is a consequence of the direct network effect. On the other hand, in order to attract a sufficient mass of early consumers the platform must charge a small enough price at t = 1. Therefore, the platform trades off building an earlier mass of consumer base and extracting profits from early adopters. As a result, there is an optimal mass of consumersN 1 that balances these two forces. In addition, we find that it might be optimal for the platform to exclude some consumers from the market completely. This is the case only if the value of the complementary good is relatively small (N 1 +N S 2 < 1 if α < 1). However, if the additional benefit from the complementary good is high (α ≥ 1), then it is optimal to serve the whole market. We summarize the results in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1. The Optimal timing of joining the platform.
Proof : See Appendix.
Equilibrium Probability of Success. We next discuss the equilibrium probability of success,P . Since the seller correctly anticipates when each type of consumer joins the platform, the choice ofP is determined by the equilibrium values ofN 1 andN S 2 . In Appendix we formally prove that the platform's profit is 30 It is straightforward thatN F 2 = 0. Suppose there is an equilibrium withN F 2 > 0, i.e., where some consumers find it optimal to wait till t = 2 and then join the platform even if the complementary good fails. Necessarily, p 1 > p 2 in such an equilibrium and at least some of these consumers retain a strictly positive surplus. The platform then can make a higher profit by extracting this surplus by increasing p 2 .
A higher probability of success for the complementary good changes the optimal timing of joining the platform for some consumer types. For example, consider a typeθ who is just indifferent between joining the platform at t = 1 and at t = 2. Suppose now the probability increases. Then typeθ consumer strictly prefers joining the platform at t = 1 rather than waiting till t = 2. The platform then can increase price p 1 accordingly to extract the expected surplus from typeθ. Therefore, the platform jointly adjusts prices and the probability to maximize the profit. Intuitively,P equalizes the marginal benefit of increasing the probability of success and the marginal cost of efforts. We prove that in equilibrium
We find thatP is an increasing function of α, and a decreasing function of A. These two results should appear intuitive. The higher the value added by the complementary good (high α), the higher the surplus that can be extracted from the consumers and, therefore, the higher the benefit of success for the seller. When the effort necessary fro achieving success is costlier (high A), a marginal increase in the probability of success becomes less beneficial.
The Optimal Pricing Policy. We now determine pricesp 1 andp 2 the platform chooses in equilibrium. A critical question for the platform is whether to use a price penetration (p 2 >p 1 ) or a price skimming (p 1 >p 2 ) policy. When choosing whether to charge a smaller price at t = 2 than at t = 1, the platform is facing the following trade-off.
On the one hand, there are two reasons to lower the price at t = 2. First, consumers who join the platform at t = 1 enjoy the basic good over two periods rather than just one. Given that early buyers are high-type consumers, the platform may extract surplus from them and then use a low price strategy at t = 2. Second, due to the indirect network effect, early consumers at t = 1 buy not only the basic good itself, but also an option to benefit from the complementary good if it is successfully developed in the future. The platform extracts this surplus at t = 1 by charging a higher price. Then, at t = 2, the platform lowers the price 31 Formally,P is determined by
the condition is derived by differentiating the platform's profit given by and serves the low-type consumers who are willing to join only if the complementary good is successfully developed. On the other hand, there are as well two reasons to increase the price of the basic good at t = 2. First, a lower price at t = 1 increases the number of early consumers and, as a result, the value of the basic good in the future increases due to the direct network effect. Second, consumers join the platform at t = 2 only if they can benefit from the indirect network effect after the complementary good is successfully developed. Thus, future pricep 2 should be high enough to extract surplus from the combination of both the basic and the complementary goods.
We plot graphically combination of optimal pricing policies for various parameters α (value of the complementary good) and A (cost of development the complementary good) in Figure 6 . We can see that the price skimming policy is optimal for relatively small values of A. Intuitively, if the cost of development of the complementary good is sufficiently low then the probability of success is high in equilibrium. Since consumers will benefit from the complementary good almost for sure, they are more likely to join the platform at t = 1. The platform is then better off extracting their surplus earlier.
In contrast, if the cost of development of the complementary good is relatively high, the complementary good is less likely to be developed. Then the platform might not charge a high price before uncertainty is realised and, as a result, price penetration policy might become optimal. The magnitude of the indirect effect depends on the equilibrium probability that the complementary good is successfully developed,P , which, as we proved above, is increasing in α. Therefore, we expect and indeed find that the platform price skimming (p 1 >p 2 ) policy if the value of the complementary good is relatively small (high), i.e., p 2 <p 1 for small α andp 2 >p 1 as α becomes higher. We illustrate this price dynamics in Figure 7 , wherep 2 <p 1 for α < 0.3 andp 2 >p 1 if α ≥ 0.3. Interestingly, we also find another effect. When α becomes sufficiently large (α ≥ 2 in Figure 7) , it is again optimal to use price penetration (p 1 <p 2 ). Intuitively, if the benefit of the complementary is large, it will be successfully developed with high probability. Since the complementary good is very likely to succeed, consumers who join the platform at t = 1 are almost certain to benefit from the indirect network effect. The platform is then better off by extracting this surplus form the option value earlier. Note that this is the case if consumers value the complementary good a lot. For example, gamers may buy a video game console to play a particular game: Soccer fans may buy PlayStation to enjoy FIFA 19. 32 We summarize all the results in Proposition 2 below. Proposition 2. The Optimal Pricing Policy.
Another example is a consumer who buys a smartphone to mostly use a particular app (Uber or Lyft).
Extensions and Discussion

Equilibrium without Commitment
In this section, we remove the possibility for the platform to commit to a future price. Therefore, we now require the equilibrium to be subgame perfect. 33 This implies that the platform chooses price p 2 af ter observing a mass of consumers N 1 , and this choice must be optimal at that point in time. For consumers, it is also common knowledge at t = 1 that the price p 2 is optimally chosen after N 1 has been observed by the platform (given the remaining potential consumer base).
To see what effects an absence of commitment leads to, recall the trade-off the platform is facing when determining the optimal pricing policy. 34 In order to attract enough consumers at t = 1, the platform has to "threaten" potential consumers with a higher price in the future. 35 This is exactly what our main model predicts for intermediate values of α (see Figure 6 ). Commitment to a higher future price p 2 is, therefore, critical for building a necessary mass of consumers at t = 1. 36 We characterize the equilibrium using backward induction. First, given a mass of consumers N 1 , we determine the optimal mass of consumers the platform attracts at t = 2. Since in equilibrium all consumers will be divided in (at most) three groups, the second period price has to satisfy
In particular, we are looking for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. See (Hagiu, 2006) for the details. 34 In a model with a durable good but without a network effect, a monopolist chooses to lower its price in the second period in order to sell to the residual consumers. This causes the so-called "Coase effect."
35 Alternatively, a smaller price at t = 1, p 1 , allows building an early mass of consumers, N 1 . 36 Commitment is critical if p 2 < p 1 as well. This is the case when the benefit of the complementary good, α (and, consequently,P ) is sufficiently high. Now the platform commits to make p 2 < p 1 in the future, but keep p 2 as close to p 1 as possible.
37 This follows directly from the fact that, in equilibrium, θ < p2−α N1+N S 2 never join the platform, p2−α N1+N S 2 ≤ Therefore, at t = 2 the platform is choosing N S 2 (N 1 ) to maximize the second period profit
Consequently, given any N 1 , the platform optimally attractsN S 2 (N 1 ) customers at t = 2, whereN S 2 (N 1 ) = min
Given the expression forN S 2 (N 1 ), the platform chooses N 1 and P at t = 1 (such that 0 ≤N 1 +N S 2 (N 1 ) ≤ 1) to maximize the total expected profit profit
While we delegate the formal analysis to the Appendix, we use a numerical example to illustrate the benefit of commitment for the platform. Suppose α = 1 and A = 1 2 , then the main model with commitment predicts thatN 1 = 2 3 ,N 2 = 1 3 , andp 2 = 1 >p 1 = 0.747 and the total profit is π S = 0.6276. In absence of commitment,N 1 = 0.6,N 2 = 0.4, and p 2 = 0.79 >p 1 = 0.69 and the total profit is π S = 0.5935.
Using the example above, we emphasize that the benefit of commitment is two-fold. First, commitment allows building a larger early consumer base at t = 1 (in the example, at t = 1 the platform attracts 2 3 of total consumers with commitment and only 0.6 in absence of commitment). 40 More generally, to see how an absence of commitment alternates the platform's incentives in building a consumer base, recall than with commitment (see Proposition 1) N 1 = 2 3 andN S 2 = min{ √ 1+3α−1 3 , 1 3 }. Next, for any α 0, it is the case that
join the platform at t = 2 only if the complementary good is successfully developed, and θ ≥ p1−P p2 (2−P )N1+(1−P )N F 2 join the platform at t = 1 (see Figure 5 ). 38 The First Order Condition is
which leads to a quadratic equation 3(N S 2 ) 2 + (4N 1 − 2)N S 2 + N 2 1 − N 1 + α = 0. The second order condition requires N 1 + N S 2 (N 1 ) 1 for any 0 N 1 1. 39 The expression for p 1 is given by N 1 ) , and b = dc(P ) dP is derived from the seller's optimization problem. 40 Recall that establishing the early consumer base allows the platform to extract a higher surplus in the future due to the direct network effect. Therefore, with commitment the platform attracts (weakly) fewer consumers at t = 2 than in absence of commitment (after attracting N 1 = 1 3 at t = 2). Second, commitment to a higher price in the future allows charging a higher price at t = 1 (in the example, at t = 1 the platform chargesp 1 = 0.747 with commitment and onlŷ p 1 = 0.69 in the absence of commitment). Since more consumers buy the basic good at t = 1, the platform might charge a higher initial price p 1 due to the direct network effect.
Type-Dependent Externality, α(θ) = αθ.
We now consider a modification of the main model and allow the benefit of the complementary good to be a function of consumer type, i.e., α(θ) = αθ for each θ ∈ [0, 1], where α > 0. For example, an additional app released for an iPhone might benefit more those consumers who already use iPhone itself more often. 41 The equilibrium is derived formally in Appendix, and the key results are presented in Proposition 3. We provide the intuition below.
We begin the analysis by describing the equilibrium mass of consumersN 1 ,N S 2 , andN F 2 . Similarly to the main model (see Proposition 1), it is the case thatN F 2 = 0. However, a novel result of this section is that if the benefit of the complementary good depends on a consumer type, the platform prefers not to sell the basic good at t = 2. Therefore, in equilibrium all consumers will be divided into two groups only: 1) "high-type" consumers those who join the platform before observing whether the complementary good succeeds (at t = 1), and 2) "low-type" consumers who never join the platform (see Figure 8 Intuitively, if the benefit of the complementary good depends on consumer type, the platform cannot charge sufficiently high price at t = 2. Recall that consumers who wait and join the platform at t = 2 are not the highest types. Therefore, price p 2 must be small enough to attract at least some of them. In addition, α(θ) = αθ imposes an upper bound on p 2 . 42 As a result, it is not optimal for the platform to sell the basic good at t = 2 anymore. 41 Another example might be video game platforms, such as Atari, Nintendo, Sega, Sony Play Station, and Microsoft X-Box. In this case, an additional benefit from a newly released game for a consumer depends on whether she is a frequent player who enjoys the game console a lot or not.
42 In the main model where α(θ) = α, the platform can charge p 2 α.
We summarize results in Proposition 3 below. Proposition 3. Optimal Timing of Joining the Platform if α(θ) = αθ.
General Utility Function
To focus on characterizing the effect of technological uncertainty, we have assumed that the utility function is linear in both consumer type and the current consumer base. We should note that our main results might be extended to a more general utility function that might be relevant in other applications. For example, one may assume that the marginal utility of type θ consumer is a non-linear function of his type. Our main results that all consumers are divided into (at most) three groups remain intact with any more general utility function as long the direct externality is non-negative, i.e., ∂u(θ,N ) ∂N ≥ 0. However, a more general utility function will not allow us to derive the explicit characterization of the relevant mass of consumers and corresponding price levels.
Distribution of Consumer Preferences (N iche Markets)
We presented the main model assuming the uniform distribution of consumer type. While considering a mass market allows us to derive the explicit solution, our results give some guidance into possible equilibrium in niche markets. We discuss now implications of our model for various distributions of consumer type.
First, suppose there are many low-type consumers and higher types are almost uniformly distributed (see the blue solid line in Figure 9 ). An example might be a low temperature country where only few people find electric cars desirable. This type of distribution makes excluding low-type consumers costlier and, consequently, some of the results from the main model might change. In particular, charging a higher price at t = 1 and then lowering it at t = 2 may become sub optimal. 43 The reason is that now the platform must make its profit form the low-type consumers. Since charging a higher price earlier can attract only very few high-value consumers, the platform might be better off by lowering the price of the basic good at t = 1 in order to establish sufficient consumer base early. Second, suppose consumer type distribution is skewed so that there are many high-type consumers and lower types are almost uniformly distributed (see the red dashed line in Figure  9 ). An example might be a high temperature country where richer people find electric cars attractive, whereas poorer consumers prefer conventional cars due to cheap gasoline. Then, our intuition and results from the main model still remain intact. In particular, recall that the platform optimally excludes the low value consumers when the value of the complementary good is small (see Proposition 1). This is still optimal since the platform first attracts highvalue consumers in order to build an early consumer base. However, when there are many low-type consumers, the platform will find it optimal to charge a relatively smaller price at t = 2 to maximize second period profit.
Implications and Applications
We now discuss some examples from the empirical literature in light of our model. In particular, we present some evidence that both supports our model and provides an opportunity for explanation. The main testable predictions are generated by Propositions 1 and 2 regarding the optimal timing of joining the platform by consumers and the optimal pricing policy employed by the platform, respectively.
Electric Vehicles. The market for electric vehicles is a case in point. Consider the electric vehicles manufacturers such as Tesla, Toyota, or Renault-Nissan (platform) that must attract consumers who purchase a vehicle with a set of features related both to driving comfort and battery technology, such as, driving range, charging time, and safety. Buyers of electric vehicles express concerns over both battery range and lack of sufficient public charging stations. 44 Given these concerns, we expect that consumers' purchase decisions are not simply a function of the features that an electric vehicle carries at the time of purchase but also any future improvements in the battery technology, availability of charging stations, and even self-driving functionality. The platform must guarantee there is sufficient infrastructure to recharge a vehicle and the battery technology will be developed further. Therefore, companies like Panasonic, LG Chemical, or AESC (seller) must be incentivized to invest in charging stations and battery development. In addition, developers of self-driving functionality (seller) must be incentivized to make significant progress in development in a reasonable time. In this example, the the value of the complementary good (a local charging station and a battery) is high relative to the benefit from the basic good (an electric vehicle).
Marketing literature indicates that there is a clear segmentation in the consumer side of the market, and describes the three types of consumers in the electric vehicles market: high-value consumers (e.g., environmentally conscious or technology oriented) who purchase an electric vehicle even before a sufficiently wide network of charging stations is developed, the mass market (consumers who buy an electric vehicle only if the battery performance is sufficiently improved), and a third group who would rather buy a conventional type of car. 45 This is consistent with our model and Proposition 1.
Pricing policies adopted by electric vehicle producers also exhibit features consistent with our model. For example, consider Tesla and its car with full self-driving capabilities. Tesla's cars aren't yet capable of full autonomy, and Elon Musk has said he expects the full set of features to be ready within the next two years. In August 2019, Telsa increased the price of a model with full self-driving capabilities. The company also announced that the price will keep rising as the technology keeps developing further. In April 2019, Alon Musk said the price of full self-driving functionality would "increase substantially over time." 46 This price dynamics is consistent with the optimal pricing policy in Proposition 2 for a high value of the complementary good α and high development costs A. For these parameters, the platform optimally employs price penetration policy and increases the price in the future.
44 See Egbue and Long (2012) . 45 See McKinsey Global Survey (2017) and references therein. 46 "As mentioned earlier this year, cost of the Tesla FSD option will increase every few months. Those who buy it earlier will see the benefit," Musk wrote. See https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/16/tesla-cuts-price-onmodel-3-discontinues-versions-of-model-s-model-x.html.
Video Game Consoles. The video game consoles is another example of a two-sided market that exhibits features that can be described with our model. The value of a particular game console (platform) to gamers (consumers) depends on both the number of other gamers who play on the same platform and the number of game titles developed by the third-party developers. Therefore, a video game console is a two-sided market that is characterized by both direct and indirect network externalities.
For a game console producer, it is crucial to build and maintain a gamer base. This is not achieved simply by introducing technologically superior consoles but through a combination of attracting developers and building and managing gamers' expectations about both the number of other gamers and future games that will be offered. The strategy to build and maintain the gamer base is to manage gamers' expectations. When gamers choose a particular console, they not only consider the platform technology, i.e., speed and quality of graphics, but also the plethora of current and future games that will be available on the platform. 47 Pricing policies adopted by video game console producers are in agreement with predictions of our model. It is typical for video game consoles to become cheaper as more games are developed. Examples are abundant. This was the case for Atari Jaguar released by Atari Corporation in 1993, for Sega Saturn released in 1993, Sony PlayStation introduced in 1995, and many others. 48 This price dynamics is consistent with the optimal pricing policy in Proposition 2 for relatively low development costs A when the platform optimally employs a price skimming policy and lowers the price in the future.
Media Service Providers. Another example we discuss is a media service provider. Consider companies providing streaming services such as HBO, Netflix, or Amazon Prime (platform) that must attract both subscribers (consumers) and developers of visual and audio content (seller). This business model exhibit features that can be described with our model too. There are both direct and indirect positive network effects. Subscribers benefit more from the service when more of their friends and acquaintances watch the same movies and TV series. At the same time, if a platform manages to establish a large subscriber base, visual and audio content producers are more likely to develop the content consistent with the preferences of the platform's clientele. 47 Platforms often "vaporware" and spend millions of dollars to build an image of large gamer base and more game titles to appear in the future. For instance, Microsoft allocated a $500 million advertising budget to build an impression of large gamer base (Schilling, 2003) .
48 See Cool and Paranikas (2008) and references therein.
Our model predicts that the platform's optimal price path can be ascending or descending over time, depending on critical parameters of the model (the value of the complementary good α and development costs A). Netflix pricing policy is an example of an increasing price over time. The platform has steadily increased its standard and premium subscription fees. The standard subscription fee has reached 12.99$/m in 2019, stating from 8.99$/m in 2010, equivalent of a total 44% increase over the past 9 years. The company's biggest price increase happened in Jan 2019, going up from 10.99$/m to 12.99$/m. 49 Consistent with our model, a recent New York Times article mentions that "Spending big on content while keeping prices modest has helped Netflix expand its customer base, about 58 million in the United States and 130 million worldwide."
While the company was suffering from negative cash-flow in previous years, it did not increase prices much until a large subscribers base was established. 50
Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of technological uncertainty in a two-sided market where the platform offers a basic good and the developer offers a complementary good. The development of the complementary good is stochastic and is successful with some probability only. The early buyers obtain the basic product as well as a real option to benefit from possible enhanced functionality in the future. The platform provides incentives to both consumers and the developer by choosing the optimal dynamic pricing policy.
We show that consumers are divided into at most three groups of early adopters, late adopters, and those who never joiner the platform. We find that the mass of early adopters does not depend on the value of the complementary good, whereas the mass of late adopters increases if the value of the complementary good goes up. When the value of the complementary good is sufficiently large, the platform serves the whole market.
The platform's pricing policy is determined by the value of the complementary good as well as the costs of its development. If the development costs are sufficiently low, then the platform follows a price skimming policy and charges a higher price for those consumers joining the platform earlier. For higher development costs, the platform alternates between price skimming and price penetration. In this case, the seller has less incentives to engage in development of the complementary good and thus the probability of success is also lower. In order to the make development more attractive for the seller, the platform might employ a price penetration strategy and reduces the first period prices. We now characterize the equilibrium if α(θ) = α > 0 for all θ. First, we study the optimal timing of joining the platform for each consumer type for given prices p 1 and p 2 , the probability of success P , and N 1 , N F 2 , and N S 2 . we study the sellerâs optimal choice of the success probability for a given reward b. Next, in Section 4.2, Finally, in Section 4.3, we solve for the platformoptimal pricing policy and the corresponding mass of consumers who join the platform atdifferent times in equilibrium.
We first determine the consumer's optimal decision when to join the platform for given N 1 , N F 2 , and N S 2 . Then, we solve the platform's optimization problem and determine the equilibrium values ofN 1 ,N F 2 , andN S 2 .
Consumers. Given N 1 , N F 2 , and N S 2 , a type θ consumer gets an expected utility from joining the platform at t = 1 and waiting till t = 2, U 1 and U 2 , respectively, that are determined as follows.
Consider first a consumer of type θ at period t = 2 who did not join the platform at t = 1. We prove next that there are three relevant types of consumers who differ in their optimal decision at t = 2. First, a type θ consumer might find it optimal to join the platform even after the complementary good fails. This is the case if their utility is non-negative:
We denote
find it optimal to join the platform at t = 1, the same must be true for higher types
never join the platform,
N 1 join the platform at t = 1, and p 2 N 1 +N F 2 ≤ θ < p 1 −p 2 N 1 join the platform at t = 2 only if the complementary good is successfully developed.
This case cannot be sustained in equilibrium either. The reason is that in this case N F 2 = N S 2 and, therefore, (C1) p 2 <
join the platform at t = 2 only if the complementary good is successfully developed, and θ ≥ p 1 −P p 2 (2−P )N 1 +(1−P )N F 2 join the platform at t = 1. Case D. θ < p 1 −P α 2N 1 +P N S 2 +(1−P )N F 2 never join the platform, and θ ≥
join the platform at t = 1.
Note that case C also includes C Case D if p 2 −α
. Therefore, it is without loss of generality to consider case C only. We prove next that in equilibrium all consumers are divided in at most three groups according to their types.
join the platform at t = 2 only if the complementary good is successfully developed, and θ ≥ p 1 −P p 2 (2−P )N 1 +(1−P )N F 2 join the platform at t = 1, then
We can express prices p 1 and p 2 from the two equations 1 − N 1 − N S 2 = p 2 −α N 1 +N S 2 and 1 − N 1 = p 1 −P p 2 (2−P )N 1 as follows
Therefore, the platform is choosing 0 ≤ P, N 1 , N S 2 ≤ 1 such that N 1 +N S 2 ≤ 1 to maximize
where b = dc(P ) dP is derived from the seller's optimization problem. The first order necessary conditions for the optimizations problem are 51
. 51 Note that the First Order Conditions are also sufficient since the objective function is concave.
Finally, since
Q.E.D. We next determine the equilibrium prices. Proposition 2.
The expressions for the optimal prices directly follow from p 2 (P,N 1 ,N S 2 ) = α + (N 1 +N S 2 )(1 −N 1 −N S 2 ), and p 1 (P,N 1 ,N S 2 ) = P p 2 +(2−P )N 1 (1−N 1 ) = P α+P (N 1 +N S 2 )(1−N 1 −N S 2 )+(2−P )N 1 (1−N 1 ). Q.E.D.
The case of no commitment.
If the platform cannot commit to a future price p 2 , we must determine a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 52 We use backward induction. First, we determineN S 2 (N 1 ), i.e., the optimal consumer mass the platform attracts at t = 2 for any given past consumer base N 1 . Second, we determineN 1 , i.e., the optimal consumer mass the platform attracts at t = 1. Finally, we specify prices the platform chooses in equilibrium.
Optimal choice at t=2.
At t = 2 the platform's choice of p 2 must be optimal at that point in time for any given mass of consumers N 1 . Following the same steps as in the base model, we establish that in equilibrium all consumers are divided in (at most) three groups. As a result, the second period price has to satisfy
52 See (Hagiu, 2006) and references therein for the details. 53 This follows directly from the fact that, in equilibrium, θ < p2−α N1+N S 2 never join the platform, p2−α N1+N S 2 ≤ θ < p1−P p2 (2−P )N1+(1−P )N F 2 join the platform at t = 2 only if the complementary good is successfully developed, and θ ≥ p1−P p2 (2−P )N1+(1−P )N F Consider the platform choosing optimal price p 2 at t = 2. For any given mass of consumers N 1 and past price p 1 , the optimal pricep 2 has to maximize the platform's profit at at t = 2. The price p 2 can be rewritten from the expression above as p 2 = (1−N 1 −N S 2 )(N 1 +N S 2 )+α. Therefore, at t = 2 the platform is choosing N S 2 (N 1 ) to maximize the second period expected profit π 2 defined as
The First Order Condition, dπ 2 dN S 2 = 0, can be rewritten as
which leads to a quadratic equation 3(N S 2 ) 2 + (4N 1 − 2)N S 2 + N 2 1 − N 1 + α = 0, and the relevant root isN S 2 (N 1 ) = . 54 In addition, we have to take into account the second order condition, which requires that for any given N 1 , the total mass of consumers who joined the platform by t = 2 does not exceed the total feasible consumer base: N 1 + N S 2 (N 1 ) 1 for any 0 N 1 1. Consequently, given any N 1 , the platform optimally sells toN S 2 (N 1 ) customers at t = 2, whereN S 2 (N 1 ) = min 1−2N 1 + √ N 2 1 −N 1 +1+3α 3 , 1 − N 1 .
Optimal choice at t=1.
Given the expression forN S 2 (N 1 ) derived in the previous section, at t = 1 the platform is choosing 0 ≤ P, N 1 ≤ 1 to maximize the total profit. Since in equilibrium all consumers are divided in (at most) three groups, the first period price has to satisfy 1 − N 1 = p 1 −P p 2 (2−P )N 1 . 55
The price p 1 then can be rewritten from the expression above as p 1 = P α + P (N 1 + N S 2 )(1 − N 1 − N S 2 ) + (2 − P )N 1 (1 − N 1 ). 56 54 The second root of the quadratic equation does not belong to the domain, i.e., it violates 0 N S 2 (N 1 ) 1 condition.
55 See Figure 5 in the main section for an illustration. 56 We also use p 2 = (1 − N 1 − N S 2 )(N 1 + N S 2 ) + α from the previous section.
Therefore, at t = 1 the platform is choosing 0 ≤ P, N 1 ≤ 1 to maximize p 1 × N 1 + P × N S 2 × p 2 − P b = P (N 1 +N S 2 (N 1 )) α + (N 1 +N S 2 (N 1 ))(1 − N 1 −N S 2 (N 1 )) + (2 − P )N 2 1 (1 − N 1 ) − P c (P ), where b = dc(P ) dP is derived from the seller's optimization problem. The first order necessary conditions are 57 [P ]: α(N 1 +N S 2 (N 1 )) + (N 1 +N S 2 (N 1 )) 2 (1 − N 1 −N S 2 (N 1 )) − N 1 (1 − N 1 ) − c (P ) − P c (P ) = 0; [N 1 ]: P α + P 2(N 1 + N S 2 )(1 − N 1 − N S 2 ) − (N 1 + N S 2 ) 2 + (2 − P ) 2N 1 (1 − N 1 ) − N 2 1 = 0. To see who an absence of alternates the platform's incentives in building a consumer base, recall than with commitment (see Proposition 1) N 1 = 2 3 andN S 2 = min{ √ 1+3α−1 3 , 1 3 }. Next, for any α 0, it is the case that
Therefore, with commitment the platform attracts (weakly) fewer consumers at t = 2 than in absence of commitment (after attracting N 1 = 2 3 at t = 1).
8.3 Type-Dependent Externality, α(θ) ≡ αθ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Suppose α(θ) = αθ, where α > 0. We first determine the consumer's optimal decision when to join the platform for given N 1 , N F 2 , and N S 2 . Then, we solve the platform's optimization problem and determine the equilibrium values ofN 1 ,N F 2 , andN S 2 . Given N 1 , N F 2 , and N S 2 , the type θ consumer gets utility from joining the platform at t = 1 and waiting till t = 2, U 1 and U 2 , respectively, that are determined as follows.
U 1 (θ) = θN 1 − p 1 + P × θ(N 1 + N S 2 ) + αθ + (1 − P ) × θ(N 1 + N F 2 ) , and U 2 (θ) = P × max{θ(N 1 + N S 2 ) + αθ − p 2 , 0} + (1 − P ) × max{θ(N 1 + N F 2 ) − p 2 , 0}.
Consider first a consumer of type θ at period t = 2 who did not join the platform at t = 1. There are three types of customers that differ in their optimal decision. First, the consumer of type θ might find it optimal to join the platform even after the complementary good fails. This is the case if θ(N 1 + N F 2 ) − p 2 ≥ 0. We denote 57 Similarly to the main model, the First Order Conditions are also sufficient since the objective function is concave.
[N 1 ]: (2 − P ) 2N 1 (1 − N 1 ) − N 2 1 + P d (N 1 +N S 2 )(1−N 1 −N S 2 )(N 1 +N S 2 +α) dN 1 + µ 1 = 0;
[N S 2 ]: P d (N 1 +N S 2 )(1−N 1 −N S 2 )(N 1 +N S 2 +α) dN S 2 + µ 2 = 0; [P ]: (N 1 + N S 2 )(1 − N 1 − N S 2 )(N 1 + N S 2 + α) − N 1 (1 − N 1 ) − c (P ) − P c (P ) = 0. Combining [N 1 ] and [N S 2 ] we derive (2 − P ) 2N 1 (1 − N 1 ) − N 2 1 + µ 1 = µ 2 , which implies µ 2 > 0 and, consequently,N S 2 = 0. Therefore, the platform is choosing N 1 to maximize P N 1 (1−N 1 )(N 1 +α)+(2−P )N 2 1 (1−N 1 ) = N 1 (1−N 1 )(P α +2N 1 ). Consequently, N 1 = 2−P α+ √ (2−P α) 2 +6P α 6 > 0. Q.E.D. Finally, the expressions for the optimal prices directly follow from p 2 (P,N 1 ,N S 2 ) = (N 1 + α)(1 −N 1 ) and p 1 (P,N 1 ,N S 2 ) = (1 −N 1 )(2N 1 + P α). Therefore,
